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ARTICLES

The Limits of Formal Economics in
Tort Law
THE PUZZLE OF NEGLIGENCE
Shawn J. Bayern†
Legal scholars commonly see tort law as the jewel of the
law-and-economics movement. “The law of accidents was one of
the first bodies of private law successfully analyzed using
formal economic models,”1 a leading law-and-economics
textbook confidently declares. Leading commentators, even
when critical of law and economics, commonly suggest that tort
law has succumbed to fairly straightforward economic
modeling.2
This Article challenges the view that economic modeling
has explained and justified tort law by demonstrating that it
has failed to explain or justify tort law’s basic negligence rule.
A rule of negligence, versus alternatives like strict liability,
holds injurers liable in tort only if they have not taken
reasonable precautions.3 An economic understanding of
negligence, such as the one commonly known as the Hand
Formula, defines “reasonable precautions” as those that are
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Jamie Boyle, Ariel Porat, Ruben Pope, and Mark Seidenfeld for helpful critical
comments. All errors are negligent.
1
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 324 (5th ed. 2008).
2
E.g., Leo Katz, A Look at Tort Law with Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 307, 308 (1996) (resisting a solely economic view in criminal law but referring to
“law and economics’ admittedly remarkable success at explaining tort law”).
3
See DAN B. DOBBS, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 275 (2001) (“Negligence
is conduct that creates or fails to avoid unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm to
others.”).
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cost-justified.4 In general, the models that economists have
constructed to justify economic conceptions of negligence rules
seem persuasive on the surface, but on closer analysis they
suffer from significant problems that make them either
logically problematic or impossible to administer. Ultimately,
the economists’ formal models do not serve to justify negligence
rules.
Many commentators, from a variety of perspectives,
have already criticized particular forms of economic reasoning
in tort law. Some, like Richard Wright, have argued
persuasively that courts have diverged from the reductionist
view now dominant in American legal academia, and thus that
economic reasoning has not, in fact, explained or captured
American tort law.5 My goal in this Article, however, is
normative rather than descriptive: my aim is not to suggest
that law-and-economics arguments have failed to influence
courts, but rather that they have failed on their own terms to
justify the efficiency of negligence rules.
Separately, it is common to see arguments that injurers
do not respond to incentives in the way economists predict
because people are simply not rational, are not aware of the
law, or have more pressing concerns than distant and relatively
weak financial incentives.6 I am sympathetic to these critiques
and believe they are largely correct, but my goal here is
somewhat different: my aim is to advance the discussion of tort
law by showing that the leading formal, deductive conceptions
of negligence rules fail in fundamental ways, essentially on
their own terms, even if we accept for argument’s sake most or
all of their reductionist assumptions about human behavior. In
4

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-71 (7th ed. 2007).
Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula”, 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145 (2003) (showing that even Learned Hand and
Richard Posner, two judges who, respectively, developed and promoted the Hand
Formula, have not generally applied it in tort cases before them); Richard W. Wright,
Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS 143, 145 (2003) (“The
[leading economic understanding of negligence], although pervasive in the secondary
literature and mentioned by a small minority of courts, is almost never used by the
courts to decide whether particular conduct was negligent. Instead, the courts
employ . . . a number of different criteria . . . based on the principles of justice.”); see
also Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605,
1611 (1997) (questioning the role of economics in positive tort law); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2002, 2026 (2007) (offering a
similar rejection of the Hand Formula as a positive account of negligence law’s
standard of care and listing other commentary that has done so).
6
See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (surveying the state of such
arguments).
5
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other words, my goal is to take the leading formal economic
conceptions of negligence rules off the table as serious
contenders for the sole principled basis for tort law, even if
humans were generally capable of behaving as simple slaves to
rationality.
It is important to say that my goal is not to show that
economic reasoning has provided no insight into tort law or
that a proper understanding of tort law would ignore economic
analysis. Indeed, I think economic reasoning has been, and can
continue to be, helpful. To understand and justify tort rules,
however—even on instrumental grounds—courts and
commentators need to look beyond model-based deductions.
Similarly, my argument here is not against negligence
rules, which may be supported by sound reasons of morality
and policy. My argument is just that these rules cannot be
derived in ways that leading legal economists appear to
purport to derive them.
In Part I, I review the basic economic features of
negligence and strict-liability rules and show why early
attempts at analyzing tort law economically provided virtually
no help in choosing between those two rules—and indeed how,
in fairness, they often were not even meant to. For instance,
although it is occasionally thought that the early law-andeconomics scholars developed economic analyses that favored
negligence rules over strict-liability rules,7 even those early
scholars often admitted that theoretical microeconomics could
not help judges or policymakers choose between negligence and
strict liability.8 As an example, one early straightforward

7

See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1819-20 (1997) (“From an
economic perspective the Hand formula makes excellent sense. The formula can be
seen as designed to encourage efficient investments in safety and risk reduction; as
such, it has served as a cornerstone for economic analysis.”); Frank J. Vandall, Judge
Posner’s Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383, 404 (1986)
(referring to “[e]conomists’ preferences for negligence”).
8
See Mark M. Hager, The Emperor’s Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner’s
Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7, 44 (1991) (“Although Posner has
attempted to defend the efficient character of the negligence standard, his arguments
closely read have concentrated on the modest claim that negligence is no less efficient
than strict liability.”); Vandall, supra note 7, at 404 (“Economists’ preference for
negligence is undermined by the fundamental admission that ‘after two decades of
writing on the subject, we still cannot say with certainty whether strict liability or
negligence is the most efficient rule in most areas of accident law.’” (quoting Henry
Hansmann, The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
217, 226 (1983))); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 312 (1995) (“According to the conventional economic analysis,
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understanding of negligence rules was that they are efficient
because they give self-interested injurers incentives to take
efficient precautions.9 But even if this proposition is correct, as
a defense of negligence rules over strict-liability rules it would
be entirely hollow: strict-liability rules give self-interested
injurers similar incentives to take efficient precautions, as the
pioneers of law and economics well understood.
In Part II, against this backdrop, I explain and then
refute what is currently the leading theoretical economic
understanding of negligence rules in tort law—a view that top
analysts like Robert Cooter and Steven Shavell have helpfully
adopted, clarified, and defended.10 This view has two
components: First, it suggests that negligence rules efficiently
create incentives for bilateral precaution—that is, for both
injurers and victims to behave carefully in cases where the
actions of both can decrease the likelihood of injuries. (For
some economists, nearly all cases of injury are cases of bilateral
precaution. As an example, if a car hits a pedestrian on a
sidewalk, it might seem like the car’s driver was the only one
who could have prevented the accident, but economists point
out that the pedestrian might have decreased the likelihood of
an accident by staying at home.)11 Negligence rules are said to
promote bilateral precaution, loosely speaking, by serving as a
threat of liability to both injurers and victims simultaneously:
both parties are said to know that if they don’t behave
carefully, they may be made to bear the costs of an accident
that occurs. Second, the leading economic view sets forth a
formal understanding of who should bear the costs of an
accident when both injurers and victims behave carefully.
Economists answer this question by turning to arguments
the choice between strict liability and negligence ordinarily does not affect
precautions.”).
9
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972)
[hereinafter Posner, A Theory of Negligence] (“If . . . the benefits in accident avoidance
exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred and the
accident averted, and so in this case the [injurer] is made liable, in the expectation that
self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort
judgments.”).
10
See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1; Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Shavell, Strict
Liability].
11
See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 338 (suggesting that in the case
where a “moving car hits [a] parked car,” the victim might “park [the] car in [a] safer
space,” and that pedestrians hit by a car might “walk more safely”). Of course, Cooter
and Ulen are not suggesting that a victim should necessarily do so, just that it is
possible. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39 for more on this distinction.
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about activity levels.12 An activity-levels argument is one that is
sensitive to the possibility that potential injurers and victims
might engage in too much of an activity (like driving), even if
they engage in it safely. For instance, if I know that as a driver
I can avoid all liability for accidents simply by driving safely, I
might therefore drive inefficiently often, thereby leading to
more accidents than would be efficient.13
For several reasons, neither of these components of the
modern theoretical understanding of negligence can
successfully justify negligence rules over their alternatives. In
short, the defense of negligence as promoting bilateral
precaution fails because it depends on an exceedingly fragile
formal model that cannot adapt even to features of the world
that, by the model’s own terms, it ought to address. For
instance, it cannot accommodate a rational party’s probabilistic
assessment that another party may act irrationally or with
incomplete information, nor can it address a variety of other
limitations. As a result, the model does not serve either as a
general explanation or a general justification for negligence
rules.
The use of activity-levels arguments is flawed too. As a
way to assign liability among innocent parties, activity-levels
arguments are ordinarily unhelpful because of problems that
courts would face if they tried to administer a tort regime
based on them, and also because they create several important
kinds of inefficiencies on their own. These inefficiencies relate
to a sort of conceptualism that has colonized tort law under the
banner of economic modeling: commentators tacitly or
explicitly observe that the goal of their models is to reduce the
net costs of precautions and accidents, but in fact an
instrumentally optimal tort law in the real world would be
sensitive to other costs, such as incorrect pricing of activities.
As a result, we reach the perhaps surprising conclusion
that formal economics has failed to explain or justify, after
decades of attempts, the basic features of negligence law.
Again, this does not mean economists have provided no insight
into the law of torts; indeed, many of their conceptions of
negligence rules have been useful in clarifying some of the
problems that tort law aims to address. Nonetheless, for a
coherent basis of tort law, this Article suggests that we
12

For the seminal analysis of activity levels in tort law, see Shavell, Strict
Liability, supra note 10.
13
See id. at 2-3.
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probably need to look beyond the models that even the best
law-and-economics scholars, like Shavell, Cooter, and Ulen,
have provided.14
I.

BASIC ECONOMIC FEATURES OF NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
LIABILITY

This Part reviews the basic economic landscape in
which tort law operates, both to provide enough background to
understand modern economic conceptions of tort law and to
clarify why the simpler economic understanding of tort rules
that preceded the presently prevalent models was not sufficient
to justify the efficiency of negligence rules over strict-liability
rules.
An example that has become conventional in tort law, as
a result of its use by Ronald Coase, involves a railroad that
passes by a field and potentially causes damage to it because of
sparks from its engine.15 I borrow Robert Cooter’s formulation
of the example for ease of exposition, because in Part II I will
take up Cooter’s arguments (among others) at length:
Suppose that Xavier operates a railroad train that emits sparks that
sometimes set fire to Yvonne’s cornfield. Xavier can reduce the harm
to the corn by installing spark arresters, by running the trains more
slowly, or by running fewer trains. In a like manner, Yvonne can
reduce the harm by planting her corn farther from the tracks, by
planting cabbage instead of corn, or by leaving the fields fallow.16

In this example, there is potential harm that results, in at least
some senses,17 from the interaction between Xavier and
Yvonne’s business activities. A rule of no liability would make
Yvonne, the owner of the cornfield, bear the entire cost of the
harmful interaction by preventing her from recovering any
14

See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1; Shavell, Strict Liability,
supra note 10.
15
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29-31
(1960).
16
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
17
According to what Mark Kelman has called “the most basic Coasean
insight,” no cases of tortious harm occur without both parties in some sense causing the
harm, because, at a minimum, the harm can’t occur without both of their existence.
Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal
Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 579 (1987) (“[G]iven that . . . injury cannot
have occurred unless the plaintiff . . . existed, . . . [i]t will never be the case that injury
could occur without the plaintiff, such that the defendant is entirely causally
responsible.”).
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money from Xavier in the event of damage to her cornfields. A
rule of strict liability, by contrast, would make Xavier bear the
entire cost of the interaction by requiring that he pay Yvonne
for any harm she incurs as a result of the railroad’s sparks. A
rule of negligence, in contrast to both other rules, would make
Xavier responsible for paying Yvonne only if some social
judgment disapproves of Xavier’s actions in running his
railroad next to Yvonne’s cornfields in a way that potentially
hurts Yvonne.
A chief feature of the economic analysis of tort law is the
economic conception of negligence rules—that is, a reduction of
such rules to a cost-benefit test. This particular formulation,
whose popularity is commonly traced to an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand,18 United States v. Carroll Towing,19 would decide
Xavier’s liability based on the costs and benefits of the
precautions he might have taken (per the example, “installing
spark arresters, . . . running the trains more slowly, or . . .
running fewer trains”).20 As an example, if the potential sparks
from the railroad are estimated to cause fires that lead to
$4000 worth of expected damage to Yvonne’s cornfield, Xavier
would be liable if any of the precautions he might take are
expected to cost less than $4000. If not, he won’t be liable.21
Analyzed from society’s perspective (rather than either
Xavier or Yvonne’s private perspectives), economists point out
that we want Xavier to take precautions only if their social cost
is less than their social benefit. That is, even though it seems
harsh to say so, there is some sense in which we want Yvonne’s
cornfield to burn down if it is too expensive to prevent fires. Of
course, in an ideal world we wouldn’t want to see Yvonne suffer
this harm, but given the real-world choice between cornfield
fires and the precautions necessary to prevent them, from an
efficiency perspective we prefer whichever is cheaper.22 Or, as

18

E.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 9, at 32 (“The essential
clue . . . [to the economic analysis of tort law] is provided by Judge Learned Hand’s
famous formulation of the negligence standard . . . .”).
19
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
20
Cooter, supra note 16, at 4.
21
There are several significant problems with even this simple formulation of
the negligence standard. For a more complete discussion, see infra Part II.D.
22
Nothing, certainly, mandates that we analyze this scenario only from the
perspective of efficiency. For instance, we might think it is unfair to let Xavier cause
fires for which he doesn’t have to pay. But the instrumental economic view does
capture an important insight, which is that Xavier and Yvonne are in some sense
symmetric: if the law made Xavier pay for his fires’ harm to Yvonne, then Yvonne’s
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Richard Posner, one of the chief proponents of this efficiencyoriented view, puts it:
If the cost of safety measures or of curtailment—whichever cost is
lower—exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by
incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, to
forgo accident prevention.23

Consider how no-liability, strict-liability, and negligence
rules fare under this view of social efficiency. If Xavier is never
liable for fires regardless of how much damage they cause, and
if he is selfish, he will have insufficient incentives to take
precautions against fire. For instance, it could cost him only
$40 to install spark arresters, but he might not want to incur
this expense even if fires are expected to cause many thousands
of dollars of harm to Yvonne’s fields. There may, of course, be
many reasons Xavier would in practice bear a small expense
even if the law does not require him to do so. He might, for
example, have internalized moral norms, be afraid of feeling
guilty for hurting Yvonne, empathize with Yvonne or have
positive feelings for her, be concerned about adverse publicity,
fear retaliatory action by Yvonne, or even consume corn
personally and worry that the price of corn will rise if he
repeatedly burns down Yvonne’s fields. But if he is both selfish
and interested only in maximizing his business profits, it is
accurate to say that he will not have proper incentives to take
efficient precautions against potentially catastrophic losses.
Consider, next, a rule of negligence. The chief feature of
the early economic analysis of negligence rules was that, if
these rules are conceived economically (as under Judge Hand’s
formula), they give Xavier incentives to take efficient
precautions.24 An economic conception of negligence under the
Hand Formula essentially tracks the social-cost analysis
described earlier: Xavier is called negligent (or unreasonable) if
he didn’t take socially efficient precautions, and he’s called
nonnegligent (or reasonable) otherwise. For example, if spark
arresters could have prevented $4000 fires at a cost of $40, and
if Xavier does not install spark arresters, he is said to be
choice to grow cornfields will have caused harm to Xavier. And it may not be fair,
always, to require Xavier to suffer this harm.
In any event, because my purpose in this Article is to show that the
economic accounts of negligence fail on roughly their own terms, I do not dwell, here,
on the noneconomic problems with viewing all legal rules too instrumentally.
23
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 9, at 32.
24
See id.
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negligent for not doing so. But if the spark arresters (and all
the other precautions) cost more than $4000, he is not
negligent.
Recall that from the perspective of social efficiency, we
want Xavier to take efficient precautions and do not want him
to take inefficient ones. Because a negligence rule gives Xavier
incentives to take efficient precautions and not to take
inefficient ones, the early economic analysts of law presented it
as an efficient rule. For instance, as Posner wrote:
If . . . the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of
prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred and the
accident averted, and so [injurers are] made liable, in the
expectation that self-interest will lead [them] to adopt the
precautions in order to avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.25

From the way the early legal economists presented
negligence rules, it was possible to infer that their
instrumental analysis supported those rules, and only those
rules. For instance, early in the economic analysis of law,
Posner wrote as follows:
A rule making [an] enterprise liable for the accidents that occur
[when precautions are more expensive than accidents] cannot be
justified on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase
the safety of its operations.26

Posner seems to be saying that negligence rules are sufficient
to ensure that potential injurers like Xavier behave efficiently,
and as a result, rules like strict liability are unnecessary.
But even early on, economic analysts of law recognized
that negligence rules and strict-liability rules provided similar
incentives to injurers.27 To see why this is so, recall that a
negligence rule gives Xavier an incentive to spend $40, but not
$8000, on spark arresters that prevent $4000 fires. But a strictliability rule does as well. Under a rule of strict liability, Xavier
will be liable for all cornfield fires that his railroads cause,
regardless of their costs and the costs of various precautions.
So Xavier will have to pay both (1) the costs of any precautions
he takes and (2) the costs of the fires. Given that he faces both
these costs, he will have incentives to take efficient
precautions. For instance, if spark arresters cost $40 but fires
25
26
27

Id. at 33.
Id. at 32-33.
See id.
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cost $4000, he will need to pay only $40 if he installs the spark
arresters but $4000 if he does not. And if spark arresters cost
$8000 but fires still cost $4000, he will need to pay $8000 if he
installs the spark arresters but only $4000 otherwise. As a
result, he has incentives to take precautions only when they
are efficient.
In other words, it is indeed true that a rule of strict
liability (compared to negligence) “cannot be justified on the
ground that it will induce [injurers] to increase the safety of
[their] operations.”28 But it is also true that negligence itself
cannot be justified in that way (compared to strict liability).
The two rules are just as good at providing efficient incentives
to injurers, at least when they are applied to the schematic
representation of injuries with which we have been dealing.
The early economists, of course, recognized this
symmetry. Posner saw it clearly as early as 1973, when he
wrote: “Economic theory provides no basis, in general, for
preferring strict liability to negligence, or negligence to strict
liability, provided that some version of a contributory
negligence defense is recognized.”29 This was true, as Posner
also recognized fairly early, even after considering the effects of
negligence rules and strict-liability rules on the costs of
adjudication.30
Accordingly, the early economic analysis of law appears
to justify the proposition that either strict-liability or
negligence rules are better than rules of no liability. Of course,
this proposition is uncontroversial; few were seriously arguing
in the 1960s and 1970s for a complete absence of tort liability
(or for some other standard far less than negligence liability).31
But the early economic analysis, perhaps, spelled out clear
efficiency-related reasons for this.
Beyond this basic observation, however, that early
analysis offered less than commentators sometimes suppose.

28

Id.
Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 221
(1973) [hereinafter Posner, Strict Liability].
30
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 442 (2d ed. 1977) (“No
clear-cut prediction of the impact on the aggregate costs of the procedural system of
substituting strict for negligence liability emerges from our analysis.”).
31
To be sure, some commentators have suggested that historically, tort law
imposed liability less often than it does today because of the prevalence of “no duty”
rules and other roadblocks to recovery. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Historical
Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 928-44
(1981).
29
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Posner and others believed,32 and generally still believe,33 that
this early form of economic analysis of tort law demands, from
the point of view of social efficiency, that we conceive of the
negligence standard in terms of the Hand Formula. To make
this point clear, it is important to distinguish two possible
normative conclusions from the kind of economic analysis I
have discussed in this Part.
First, the analysis purports to address the choice
between no liability, negligence, and strict liability. As I have
noted, the analysis is correct, at least on its own terms, if it
means to suggest that rules of negligence or strict liability are
superior to a complete absence of tort liability (at least to the
extent that the tort regime aims to govern the conduct of
injurers).
Second, the analysis purports to give form to negligence
rules, by observing that under the Hand Formula, negligence
rules give injurers incentives to take efficient precaution. But
this purported conclusion is only partially correct. It is true
that a standard of negligence that requires less than the Hand
Formula would be inefficient, at least in the schematic
situations we have described involving Xavier and Yvonne. For
example, if spark arresters cost $3000, fires cost $4000, and the
legal standard for negligence liability calls Xavier reasonable
(or nonnegligent) based on an arbitrary decision that nobody
needs to install spark arresters on railroads, then Xavier will
not have incentives to install (efficient) spark arresters. To put
it differently, such a legal standard would be insufficient
because it falls below the standard of the Hand Formula.
But a legal standard that exceeded, or perhaps even just
tended to exceed, the Hand Formula could well be efficient. If
spark arresters cost $5000 and fires cost $4000, but the legal
standard for negligence liability calls Xavier reasonable only if
he spends $5000 or more on spark arresters, then he would still
prefer to pay for the fires than for the (inefficient) spark
arresters. More generally, a negligence standard based on
broad social judgments (rather than narrower cost-benefit
tests) can give injurers efficient incentives if those social
judgments tend to require more precaution than a cost-benefit
test would suggest, thereby imposing a standard between
negligence and strict liability. For instance, consider a social
32

See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 9, at 32 (referring to the
Hand Formula as “one of the few attempts to give content” to the negligence standard).
33
See POSNER, supra note 4, at 167-71.
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judgment that it is wrong, without a significant overriding
justification, to cause preventable fires through industrial
activity.34 Based on that judgment and the numeric figures I
used above, a tort regime that holds Xavier liable for all
preventable fires caused by his railroad can be just as efficient
as a tort regime based exclusively on an economically conceived
negligence rule.35
Accordingly, what the early economic analysis of law
justified, even if all its assumptions about human behavior
were correct, is less than is often imagined. On its own terms,
the early analysis justified only two propositions: (1) that either
negligence or strict liability can give injurers efficient
incentives and (2) that an efficient negligence standard needs
to be at least as strict as the Hand Formula, but it could well be
stricter.36 In short, the early economic analysis told us why we
need a legal standard that is at least as strict as negligence
liability, but it told us little more than this. Of course, this
point was probably not controversial; it is not clear that anyone
had seriously been arguing for modern tort rules that were
weaker than the Hand Formula. But while the early economic
analysis justifies at least that standard, it is important to
recognize that it would be a mistake to take the early analysis
as even slightly suggesting that no greater a standard would be
efficient. The early economic analysis is compatible with many
possible negligence standards, as long as they provide liability
when a Hand Formula analysis would.

34

Cf. Stephen G. Gilles, Inevitable Accident in Classical English Tort Law, 43
EMORY L.J. 575, 576-77 (1994) (suggesting that old English law imposed liability for
accidents that could have been prevented, rather than imposing liability only for those
that should have been prevented).
35
My point in the text, more strictly, is that it is possible for a tort regime
with a higher standard than that of a negligence regime to be efficient. Not all such
regimes are necessarily efficient, however. Cooter and Ulen, in their textbook, give one
reason a legal regime with a standard higher than that of negligence could be
inefficient: it could encourage excess precaution when the legal standard is slightly
higher than that of the negligence standard, because injurers would prefer to pay for
slightly excess precautions rather than to pay for lower precautions plus the expected
cost of accidents. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 356. Cooter and Ulen’s
conclusion appears to be too strong, however. They conclude that “[i]n general, [the]
injurer’s precaution responds exactly to court errors in setting the legal standard under
a negligence regime.” Id. However, if the legal standard of conduct exceeds what they
call the “social optimum” standard sufficiently, it will typically be more efficient for
injurers to conform to that standard than to the legal standard. This is a technical
point, however, and further details concerning it are beyond the scope of this Article.
36
See Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 29, at 221; Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, supra note 9, at 32; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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With this background, we can now consider, in Part II,
more sophisticated modern economic conceptions of negligence
rules.
II.

THE LIMITS OF MODERN FORMAL ECONOMIC
CONCEPTIONS OF NEGLIGENCE

In contrast to the early economic analysis discussed in
Part I, the arguments at the center of economic discussions of
tort law (and therefore a significant part of tort-law discussions
in the United States) are substantially more complex. They aim
to address a wider range of problems and to provide more
specific recommendations concerning when injurers should or
should not be liable for the harms they cause.
Robert Cooter and Steven Shavell have rearticulated, in
slightly different ways, the leading modern analysis of
negligence rules.37 These rules depend on the recognition that
many torts cases potentially demand bilateral precaution,
which means that both injurers and victims (Xavier and
Yvonne) can take steps to reduce the likelihood or severity of
accidents. Recall that in Cooter’s example,
Xavier can reduce the harm to the corn by installing spark arresters,
by running the trains more slowly, or by running fewer trains. In a
like manner, Yvonne can reduce the harm by planting her corn
farther from the tracks, by planting cabbage instead of corn, or by
leaving the fields fallow.38

Not all cases involve bilateral precaution, but it is a
feature of many cases—more than most students initially
suppose when presented with the idea. A pedestrian afraid of
being hit by cars can avoid walking on sidewalks; a homeowner
afraid of airplanes falling from the sky can live in a location
37

STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 187-88 (2004);
Cooter, supra note 16, at 4.
38
Cooter, supra note 16, at 5. The economic model that forms the basis of
both Cooter’s and Shavell’s restatements of the reasons that negligence rules are
efficient in cases of bilateral precaution appears to originate with John Prather Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 347 (1973). Brown
recognized, interestingly, some features of the fragility of his model. For instance, he
observed: “The standard of care is critical, for, when it was changed to [a particular
alternative formulation], the identity between equilibrium and optimality was
destroyed.” Id. I develop further reasons the model is fragile in Section II.B, infra. For
ease of exposition, and to ensure that I respond to arguments in the forms in which
they remain influential, I address my discussion of bilateral precaution in the text to
Cooter’s and Shavell’s more recent formulations.
For further notes on the history of the economic analysis that informs
modern academic understanding of tort law, see SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 192-93.
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where fewer airplanes pass overhead; and so forth. In saying
that a case involves bilateral precaution, there is no inherent
moral or normative judgment; for instance, when economists
say that pedestrians can walk more safely, this does not mean,
on its own, that a pedestrian should do so or is at fault for not
doing so.39 To an economist, normative judgments depend on
costs. Accordingly, a pedestrian should, as a general matter,
walk more safely if doing so is less expensive, overall, than
asking drivers to drive more safely. Whether it is cheaper
might, of course, depend on complicated and possibly subjective
social calculations.
In this Part, I first, in Subpart A, lay out the modern
economic understanding of tort rules by explaining and
elaborating
Cooter’s
and
Shavell’s
analysis.
This
understanding is based on two principles: (1) that negligence
rules provide bilateral threats of liability and (2) that activity
levels can generally inform liability decisions. In Subpart B, I
respond to the argument that negligence rules provide efficient
bilateral threats of liability, demonstrating that the economic
models that underlie the leading economic understanding are
exceedingly fragile and almost impossible to apply. In Subpart
C, I respond to the argument that activity levels can serve as a
principled way to assign the costs of accidents between two
innocent parties, showing that modern activity-levels
arguments are both narrow and unadministrable. In Subpart
D, I address further problems that apply generally to the Hand
Formula and similar attempts to conceive negligence solely
using economic models.
A.

The Modern Understanding: Bilateral Liability Threats
and Activity Levels
1. Bilateral Precaution

The term bilateral precaution can refer to two slightly
different concepts, and it is important to keep them separate.
Consider again the case of Xavier (an injurer) and Yvonne (a
victim). In the example we have been using, both Xavier and
Yvonne can take precautions against railroad fires, and in that
39

British comedian Jimmy Carr has used this distinction as a source of
humor. Discussing drunk driving, he says: “I think the people that make the drinkdriving ads should be forced to make an advert aimed specifically at pedestrians,
simply saying, ‘Pedestrians: Watch where you’re going; some of us have had a drink.’”
DVD: Jimmy Carr: Comedian (Bwark Productions 2007).
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sense the available precautions are bilateral. But ordinarily,
economic analysis of bilateral-precaution cases assumes that
the case has an additional property—namely, that the optimal
mix of precautions to be taken in a given situation includes
some measures within Xavier’s control and others within
Yvonne’s control.40 To say this differently, given the optimal set
of precautions that can be taken, the injurer will be able to
take at least one of those precautions more cheaply than the
victim, and the victim will be able to take at least one of those
precautions more cheaply than the injurer.41 Throughout this
Article, when I refer to cases of bilateral precaution, I refer to
the second kind of case.
In bilateral-precaution cases, it is easy to see that rules
of either strict liability or no liability will, on economic grounds,
come up short. This is because rules of strict liability give
incentives for injurers to take precautions (but not victims),
and rules of no liability give incentives for victims to take
precautions (but not injurers). For example, in the case of
Xavier the railroader and Yvonne the cornfield owner, a rule of
strict liability would place the whole cost of fires on Xavier,
leading him to take precautions (spark arresters, slower trains,
or fewer trains) against fires if it is efficient for him to do so; by
contrast, a rule of no liability would place the whole cost of fires
on Yvonne, leading her to take precautions (growing corn
further away from the tracks, growing a crop more resistant to
fires, or not growing anything) against them if it is efficient for
her to do so. But in neither case will both Xavier and Yvonne—
assuming they are purely rational and self-interested, and
assuming that they have no other relevant incentives—take
precautions against fires.
The modern formal economic conception of negligence
rules in tort law attempts to address this problem in cases of
bilateral precaution—i.e., those where the only efficient mix of
precautions would come from both Xavier and Yvonne, the
injurer and the victim. In short, the modern understanding of
40

See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 341 (“[W]e consider the case in
which both the victim and injurer can take precaution, and efficiency requires both of
them to take it. We call this condition the assumption of bilateral precaution.”);
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 182-83 (“[E]xamples can obviously be constructed in which
it is optimal only for injurers to take care or only for victims to take care (or for neither
to do so). These possibilities are not the focus [of the bilateral-precaution discussion].”).
41
See Cooter, supra note 16, at 6 n.16 (“Some efficient precautions may cost
less when taken by one party or the other. Precaution is bilateral when at least one
such precaution for each party exists.”).
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negligence rules is that they provide efficient incentives to both
parties by making both think that they may be liable if they
don’t live up to their efficient standard of care. As Cooter says:
[T]he paradox [of encouraging both Xavier and Yvonne to behave
efficiently] can be resolved by adopting fault [i.e., negligence] rules
that assign responsibility for harm according to the fault of the
parties. To illustrate, a simple negligence rule requires the victim to
be compensated by the injurer if, and only if, the latter is at fault.
Under a simple negligence rule, Xavier will satisfy the legal
standard in order to avoid liability. Thus, if the legal standard
corresponds to the efficient level of precaution, Xavier’s precaution
will be efficient. Since Yvonne knows that she bears residual
responsibility, she internalizes the costs and benefits of precaution;
therefore, her incentives are efficient. Thus, if the legal standard of
fault corresponds to the efficient level of care, both parties will take
efficient precaution.42

Shavell puts it similarly:
As in the unilateral model, if the courts choose due care to equal the
socially optimal level [i.e., if negligence is set via the Hand Formula],
then injurers will be led to take due care. Victims too will be induced
to take the optimal level of care because they will bear their losses if
injurers take due care. (Drivers will be led to take due care; and
knowing that they will bear their losses, bicyclists [that the drivers
might hit] will decide to take appropriate care.)43

In other words, a negligence rule appears to encourage injurers
to take whatever precautions are efficient for them to take. But
then, because victims will expect injurers to take these
precautions and thus avoid liability, the victims will fear that
they’re going to suffer the costs of accidents themselves. As a
result, the victims, too, will take efficient precautions.
For those without economic training, what economists
mean when they refer to some precautions that victims can
take may seem counterintuitive. Why is it a “precaution” for
Yvonne, for example, to avoid growing anything in her fields at
all? The answer is that by not growing corn, she prevents any
social waste that comes from investing in corn. A fire to an
empty field might well cause no “harm.” By not planting
anything in her field, Yvonne is able to remove the possibility
that fires caused by trains will cause her to waste money in
growing corn that will simply be burned down. Of course, by
not planting anything, Yvonne presumably suffers some loss
42
43

Cooter, supra note 16, at 6-7.
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 185-86.
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because her field is not being put to productive use. But to an
economist, this loss is exactly the same kind of loss that Xavier
himself would suffer by having to install spark arresters (or to
run fewer trains). In other words, Xavier and Yvonne interact
to cause a social loss, even if Xavier is the one whose sparks
cause fires in Yvonne’s fields. Stripped of all moral dimensions
and other kinds of social judgments, both parties simply face
potential costs from two sources: (1) planning in advance of an
accident in order to reduce the expected harm from it, and (2)
either harm from the accident (in Yvonne’s case) or a
requirement to pay for harm from the accident (in Xavier’s
case).44
An example of the economists’ overall argument about
negligence rules’ effects on bilateral precaution may be in
order. Suppose that in the case of Xavier and Yvonne, two
precautions are said to be optimal: as the cheapest mix of
accident-avoidance and harm-avoidance, imagine that it is
efficient (1) for Xavier to install spark arresters at a cost of
$1200 and (2) for Yvonne to avoid planting corn within ten feet
of the railroad track, and instead to install nonflammable
rubber in that space at a cost of $800 (which includes both the
cost of the rubber and the cost of the forgone corn). Why would
such a mix be optimal? Just for the sake of the hypothetical,
suppose that fires are hugely expensive, causing $40,000 worth
of damages. Now, also suppose that if Yvonne didn’t leave a
buffer of ten feet, Xavier would have to install super-safe spark
arresters at a cost of $8000 in order to prevent fires. But
suppose, conversely, that if Xavier didn’t install any spark
arresters, Yvonne would have to leave a buffer of fifty feet, at a
cost of $6000 (as a result of the greater amount of forgone
44

Brown’s formalization of the case he describes is a clear and helpful aid to
the intuitions that underlie economists’ understanding of the bilateral tort model:
Consider a small device, a black box, which is attached to some otherwise
useful object such as a railway crossing, an airplane, or a sidewalk. The only
function of the device is to emit a bill for a large amount of money from time
to time, so we shall call it a liability generator. . . .
On the liability generator are two controls, X and Y. . . . Increasing
either or both increases the probability that the accident will be avoided . . . .
Examples of what will be meant here by controls are built-in safety devices
and careful driving in the railway crossing case, defect-free radar and careful
flying in the airplane case, and shoveling snow and careful walking in the
sidewalk case.
Brown, supra note 38, at 324. The description shows the economic symmetries between
victims and injurers in a case of bilateral precaution.
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corn), to prevent the huge costs of fires. Given this mix, the
particular efficient state of affairs is for both Xavier and
Yvonne to spend some money on precautions.
According to Cooter and Shavell, under a negligence
regime both Xavier and Yvonne can be encouraged to take
these precautions, in this case. This is because, if the legal
standards for negligence are set correctly, they believe both
Xavier and Yvonne will be afraid of suffering the $40,000 harm
from fires if they don’t take the relatively cheap—and more
importantly, optimal—precautions available to them. So they
both will do so, and together they will create a social surplus
(over other scenarios in which money is wasted either on
precautions or on fires).
It sounds attractive enough. And on the surface, the
models appear to work out the way that Cooter and Shavell
suggest. But beneath the surface, the models face significant
technical problems that prevent them from being applied
determinatively in at least many kinds of tort cases. I will
describe those problems in Subpart B, infra. But first, it will be
helpful to explain the other central features of the modern
understanding of liability rules in tort law.
2. Residual Liability
Even if negligence rules could be implemented in a way
that encourages efficient bilateral precaution, there remains an
incompleteness in the model: what happens when both parties
live up to their efficient standard of care? Just as under the
early, straightforward economic models, which suggested that
both negligence rules and strict-liability rules could encourage
efficient precaution, the bilateral-precaution model is
consistent with assigning the cost of accidents either to injurers
or to victims when both act reasonably.
To see why this is so, consider that an ordinary rule of
negligence is symmetric with a rule of “strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence.”45 If a rule of simple
negligence encourages an injurer to take precautions, and then
encourages a victim to take precautions because the injurer
avoids liability and leaves the victim holding the bill, then a
rule of strict liability combined with contributory negligence
can do something very similar, but opposite in one important
45

184-87.

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 346; see also SHAVELL, supra note 37, at
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way. Specifically, it can serve as a threat of liability to both
parties, causing both of them to behave efficiently, but then
leave the injurer (instead of the victim) responsible for any
harms that occur.46
So, for instance, in our last example, Xavier and Yvonne
might both be encouraged to take small precautions. But if a
large spark occurs from the railroad and causes a fire anyway,
Yvonne will suffer the harm under a negligence rule: both
parties met their standard, and Yvonne cannot claim in court
that Xavier was negligent. Under a strict-liability regime that
incorporates a defense of contributory negligence, by contrast,
Xavier will have to pay for Yvonne’s harm in such a case.
Given this symmetry, how can we distinguish among
the potential rules? Indeed, there are not just two possible
rules. In addition to (1) negligence and (2) strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence, other possibilities that lead
to similar results (because they all achieve bilateral liability
threats in theory) are (3) negligence with a defense of
contributory negligence, and (4) comparative negligence.47
Perhaps surprisingly, the economic analysis of all these rules—
including comparative negligence—is essentially the same, at
least in the basic cases I have outlined here.48 The supposed
incentives are the same; the only difference is who ends up
with the cost of accidents that occur when everyone behaved
efficiently (nonnegligently).
Nothing in the analysis of bilateral precautions lets us
distinguish, then, between these various possible tort regimes.49
A different kind of analysis needs to serve that role, and in the
46

The liability threats under such a regime work as follows: the victim will
take efficient precautions knowing that if she doesn’t, she will be held liable because
the injurer will be able to show that the victim was contributorily negligent. But then
the injurer will fear liability himself, because the victim has behaved properly and the
rule is one of strict liability. So the injurer will take efficient precautions too. The
mechanism by which the incentives operate is simply the mirror image of a negligence
regime’s.
47
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 344-47; SHAVELL, supra note 37, at
184-89. Both Cooter and Shavell explain how these rules achieve similar bilateral
liability threats, which should not be a surprise: the mechanism is essentially the same
under all these regimes.
48
For a more complete economic analysis, see Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S.
Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71
(1986) (arguing that comparative negligence is superior to other negligence-based rules
only when parties face particular informational limitations).
49
Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 348 (“[T]he . . . model [of bilateral
liability threats] provides a policy reason to prefer a negligence rule whenever
precaution is bilateral. The simple model does not, however, provide a reason for
preferring one form of the negligence rule to another.”).
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modern economic understanding of tort law, it comes from an
analysis of activity levels.
3. Activity Levels
To figure out whether a rule of negligence is more
efficient than a rule of strict liability (with a defense of
contributory negligence)—which is to say, to figure out who
should bear the cost of an accident when both injurers and
victims have behaved reasonably (nonnegligently)—economists
have turned to an understanding of activity levels, as pioneered
by Shavell.50 The concept is simple, though perhaps unfamiliar
to most lawyers. As Shavell originally put it:
By definition, under the negligence rule all that an injurer needs to
avoid the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if
he engages in his activity. Consequently he will not be motivated to
consider the effect on accident losses of his choice of whether to engage
in his activity or, more generally, of the level at which to engage in his
activity; he will choose his level of activity in accordance only with
the personal benefits so derived. But surely any increase in his level
of activity will typically raise expected accident losses (holding
constant the level of care). Thus he will be led to choose too high a
level of activity; the negligence rule is not “efficient.”51

Consider the activity of driving.52 Under a negligence
regime, drivers are encouraged to drive safely (because if they
don’t, they have a greater risk of being held liable for their
dangerousness). If they drive safely—that is, if they are
confident that they will always be able to drive safely—then
they know that they won’t be held liable for car accidents. But
if their very decision to drive increases the likelihood of
accidents—after all, more cars will be on the road if more
people drive, there will likely be more congestion, and perhaps
some accidents to pedestrians arise even when both drivers and
pedestrians behave safely—then they will drive too much, even
while driving safely.
Of course, it is reasonable to wonder why courts would
not simply judge drivers negligent if they drive too often, if
indeed excessive driving increases the risks of accidents. For
instance, a driver out “on a mere whim”53 could be held liable
50

See Shavell, Strict Liability, supra note 10, at 2.
Id.
52
This example—now standard in the activity-levels literature—is drawn
from Shavell. See id. at 2-3.
53
Id. at 2.
51
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more readily than an ambulance on an urgent errand, even if
both drivers were handling their vehicles with similar care. Or
a driver on a trip with virtually no social utility could be judged
negligent, when he gets into an accident, merely for being out
on the road. But courts do not make determinations like these
in practice, and in general it would be difficult for them to do
so. I return to problems concerning the distinction between
individual choices and activity levels in Part II.D.1, infra.
Modern
law-and-economics
scholars
relate
an
understanding of activity levels to liability judgments in the
following way: they argue that, when both the injurer and the
victim behave nonnegligently, liability should be assigned to
the party whose choices about activity level have a greater
chance to reduce accidents efficiently. Thus, for instance,
Cooter and Ulen write as follows: “Usually one party’s activity
level affects accidents more than the other party’s activity
level. Efficiency requires choosing a liability rule so that the
party whose activity level most affects accidents bears the
residual cost of accidental harm.”54 Shavell puts it similarly,
although perhaps in a way that accommodates broader
considerations: “Strict liability [with a defense of contributory
negligence] will result in greater social welfare [than a rule of
negligence] if it is more important for society to control
injurers’ levels of activity than victims’.”55
As an example, consider the kinds of “abnormally
dangerous” activities described in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.56 In destroying buildings with dynamite, it appears (at
least on the surface) that those using dynamite influence the
likelihood of harm more via their choice of activity level than
those who operate stores on nearby streets. To summarize the
modern economic approach to tort cases, analyzing this case
would work as follows: (1) both store owners and blasters can
take precautions against harm from dynamite in a variety of
ways, and the case is accordingly one of bilateral precaution;
(2) as a result, in terms of basic precautions, any negligencebased rules (including either (a) negligence or (b) strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence) will be optimal; (3) to
choose between them, we note that blasters’ activity levels
influence accident costs more than store owners’; (4) as a
54
55
56

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 349.
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 202.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
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result, the efficient rule is strict liability with a defense of
contributory negligence.
Having laid out this modern economic understanding,
my goal now is to demonstrate why it comes up short if its goal
is to justify or recommend particular legal rules. In Subpart B,
I address the problems with the basic bilateral-precaution
model, arguing that it insufficiently justifies negligence rules in
the first place. In Subpart C, I demonstrate that even if we
assume that negligence rules (including strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence) are efficient, activity-level
arguments—at least as understood economically—are of little
help in choosing among them. As a result, economics remains
of perhaps surprisingly little help in determining when to
assign tort liability. In Subpart D, I address a variety of other
issues that affect the applicability of the reigning economic
models, showing that fundamentally noneconomic social
judgment, rather than discrete economic cost-benefit tests,
would be needed even if the models otherwise worked as
economists intend.
B.

The Limits of Models of Bilateral Liability Threats

As I have noted, there are two central features of the
modern economic understanding of negligence rules: (1)
bilateral threats of liability and (2) activity levels as a
mechanism to decide who bears residual liability when all
parties behave optimally.57 In this Subpart, I describe several
fundamental problems with the first of these pillars.
1. A Mathematical Demonstration of the Prevailing
Economic Model
To do this, it will be necessary to consider a little more
deeply, and mathematically, the formal models at issue. For
ease of exposition, I will draw in part, at first, from a
particularly clear summary of these views by Cooter and
address variations of this model later.58
Consider, again, the example of Xavier (a railroader)
and Yvonne (a cornfield owner). Formally, the total social cost
from fires from Xavier’s railroad that burn Yvonne’s corn are
57

See supra Part II.A.
The material in the first part of this section is, accordingly, based on
Cooter. See Cooter, supra note 16, at 8-11.
58
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SC = x + y + p(x,y)a

In this formula, SC is the total social cost, x is the cost of
Xavier’s precautions (like installing spark arresters), y is the
cost of Yvonne’s precautions (like growing less corn), p(x,y) is
the likelihood of a fire, and a is the cost if there is a fire.59
A few features of this formalization are worth specially
noting. First, the cost of accidents when they occur, a, is held
constant.60 This is a reduction, and most reductions threaten
the ultimate applicability of formal models; however, this
particular reduction is not one I need to challenge for the
purposes of this Article, so I accept it in the remaining
discussion.
Second, more importantly, the probability of fire-related
accidents is expressed as p(x,y). Here, p is a function—a
mapping of some values to others. The important feature of the
way that the probability of fires is expressed, here, is that it
depends on both x and y—that is, on the precautions that both
Xavier and Yvonne take. If the probability were expressed
simply as p(x) or p(y), it would depend wholly on Xavier’s or
Yvonne’s precautions, respectively, and the case would
therefore be one of unilateral precaution. That the probability
is expressed as p(x,y) means the case is potentially one of
bilateral precaution. (I say “potentially” because the optimal x
or y could still be zero.)
To summarize so far, the total social costs (SC) are the
sum of Xavier’s precautions, Yvonne’s precautions, and the
expected costs (the probability times the magnitude) of the
fire’s harms. For the economists who have set forth these
models, the goal is simply to reduce SC through tort rules.61
Ultimately, social costs in this case depend only on x
and y. That is, given particular levels of precaution by Xavier
and Yvonne, there is an associated social cost (which consists,
again, of the costs of those precautions and the expected harm
from fires, which itself just depends on the precautions that
Xavier and Yvonne take). To economists, accordingly, the goal

59

Cf. id. at 8. I have simplified Cooter’s formula somewhat in ways that do
not affect the argument. Specifically, for Cooter, p(x,y) is the likelihood that an accident
will not occur, whereas in my example, p(x,y) is the likelihood that it will occur.
Accordingly, Cooter uses (1 • p(x,y)) to represent the likelihood of an accident.
60
Cf. id. at 8 n.24.
61
See id. at 8 (“Efficiency is achieved when social costs are minimized.”).
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is to find rules that give parties incentives to adopt an optimal
*
*
pair of values for x and y. Call these optimal values x and y .62
Now, consider the private costs that Xavier and Yvonne
face individually. These private costs will depend on tort law’s
liability rules, because Xavier and Yvonne can respond to tort
law’s incentives. The central conclusion of the economists’
models is that negligence rules (including, again, rules of strict
liability with a defense of contributory negligence)63 create
*
efficient incentives for Xavier to adopt x as his level of
*
precaution and for Yvonne to adopt y as hers.
Consider first Xavier, the potential injurer. Under a
negligence rule, Xavier’s costs can be separated into two
distinct cases: (1) if he pays for enough precaution to satisfy
tort law’s standard, then his only cost is that of the precaution,
because he won’t have to pay for any of the costs of fires; (2) if
he does not pay for enough precaution, then his cost is that of
whatever precautions he does pay for, plus the costs of fires,
because tort law will hold him liable for the damages from the
fire. In the first case, we can express Xavier’s costs simply as x.
In the second, Xavier’s costs are x + p(x,y)a.
And in this formulation, we reach the first central
stumbling block of the economic model. Because this is a case of
bilateral precaution, Xavier’s costs in this case depend in part
on the precautions that Yvonne adopts (y). This means that, if
all we know is x, there is no way to determine Xavier’s costs. If
we admit that we do not know what Yvonne’s costs might be,
there is little more we can say about Xavier’s cost. Economists,
accordingly, specify one more piece of information. They state,
as an example, that “Yvonne’s precaution is held constant at
*
the efficient level (y = y ).”64
This additional assumption, though it may appear
minor, severely undermines the model’s applicability to real
tort cases. But before I explain its problems, it will first help to
understand what it allows the formal model to do. By holding
62

Cf. id.
In the remainder of this section, I will use simple negligence rules as an
example of the class of rules that includes strict liability with a defense of contributory
negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, and comparative
negligence. This is a simplification without any loss of generality; the economists’
arguments at stake in this section, and my responses to them, treat all models in the
same way. See supra Part II.A.2.
64
Cooter, supra note 16, at 9. Shavell’s formulation is similar, although not
identical (for reasons I explain infra Part II.C.1): “[I]njurers will exercise optimal care
given that victims take due care, because then injurers will be liable for accident
losses.” SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 184-85 (emphasis added).
63
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Yvonne’s costs constant at the optimal level, Xavier’s costs can
now be expressed solely as a function of his own precaution.
Assuming that tort law’s negligence standard (as applied to
*
Xavier’s behavior) is optimal, Xavier’s costs are: (1) x if x • x ,
*
and (2) x + q(x)a if x < x , where q(x) simply represents the cost
of accidents given Xavier’s level of precaution x, assuming
Yvonne behaves optimally.
Essentially, Xavier gets to pick between choices 1 and 2,
based on the level of x he chooses. Because x + q(x)a is greater
than x (because q(x)a is positive), Xavier would prefer to pay
only x. The way for him to do this is to choose his level of
*
precaution x to equal x , the optimal amount of precaution and
the legal negligence standard for him. Consider his choice in
*
the following way: if he chooses less precaution than x , he will
have to pay for accident costs plus whatever precaution he
*
takes; if he choose a level of precaution equal to x , he avoids
*
liability and pays only x . Therefore, he will (under the model)
*
choose a precaution equal to x .65
Yvonne’s decisions are the mirror image of Xavier’s.
When considering her costs, the economists tell us similarly to
hold Xavier’s precautions constant at the optimal level.66 Then,
*
she can choose either a cost of y or y + p(x ,y) depending on
*
whether y is less than y (the legal standard for her, based on
what precautions are socially optimal for her to take). For
reasons that track the discussion of Xavier’s incentives, the
economists conclude that Yvonne will adopt the optimal level of
*
precaution, y . Accordingly, negligence rules are said to give
both Xavier and Yvonne efficient incentives; the economists
*
*
expect that Xavier will choose x and Yvonne will choose y ,
their respectively optimal levels of precaution.
2. Limits of the Model
As I have suggested, however, the model is flawed, or at
least limited in its applicability to many kinds of cases. The
internal flaws of the model—as opposed to those that highlight
the model’s incorrect or incomplete assumptions about human
65

For a more mathematical elaboration of this point, see Cooter, supra note
16, at 9-10. For an even more formal proof of essentially the same conclusion, see
generally the original discussion in Brown, supra note 38.
66
See SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 185 (“The specific reasoning [for victims] is
analogous to that in the explanation . . . of why injurers will take due care under the
negligence rule.”); Cooter, supra note 16, at 10 (premising the conclusions for the
victim’s case on the assumption “that the injurer is nonnegligent”).
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behavior—derive from a feature to which I drew attention in
the previous section: namely, that Yvonne’s behavior is held
constant when considering Xavier’s, and that Xavier’s behavior
is held constant when considering Yvonne’s.
To put this more succinctly, Xavier’s optimal behavior
depends on Yvonne’s, and Yvonne’s depends on Xavier’s. Or,
*
*
*
more formally, x depends on y , which depends on x . This may
seem circular, and in a sense it is, but the internal problem
with the economic model isn’t precisely that it is logically
circular. Variables can depend on each other, in this sense,
without collapsing a mathematical model. Indeed, this kind of
codependence between variables underlies much of game
theory: in a game, the actions of one party influence the actions
of another, which in turn can influence the actions of the first,
until an equilibrium is reached.67
The central problem comes instead from what the
mirror-image dependence demands, in this particular model’s
case. The only way to determine what the legal standard for
*
Xavier (x ) should be is to know what the legal standard for
*
Yvonne (y ) should be, and vice-versa. Accordingly, before we
can set the particular negligence rules that govern either
Xavier and Yvonne, we have to know what the optimal
behavior is for both of them. That knowledge must come as a
package, and if the economic model is to work, we must use it
to set the standards for both parties.
More precisely, for the economic model even to get off
the ground, we need to imagine that Xavier and Yvonne can
determine such optima ex ante and also that they expect that a
court analyzing the situation ex post will be able to infer the
same optima. If Xavier and Yvonne cannot determine the
optima themselves, they have no way to plan their behavior
accordingly. And if they do not expect courts to be able to
determine the proper standards ex post, then being purely
rational and selfish, they will have no reason to plan their
behavior in view of the correct legal standards.68
67

For a short introduction to game theory and the analysis of equilibria, see
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 32-42.
68
Shavell clearly outlines this requirement for his argument: “[T]o ascertain
the optimal level of due care for just one party, a court must generally determine (if
only implicitly) the optimal level of care for the other as well, because the optimal level
of care for one party will in principle depend on the other’s cost of, and possibilities for,
reducing risk.” SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 188. “This latter point,” Shavell admits,
“makes the comparison of liability rules with respect to their ease of application
different from what it might at first seem to be.” Id. Shavell also recognizes that
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The central difficulty with the formal model of bilateral
precaution arises from the impracticality of knowing in
advance, with perfect accuracy, what the optimal costs and
benefits are for parties like Xavier and Yvonne. Economists, to
be sure, do not think parties or courts (or regulators) have
access to this kind of perfect knowledge, or that parties in
Xavier and Yvonne’s positions will have access to perfect
information about one another.69 But if the model is to be
applied to tort cases in practice, the legal economists’
arguments implicitly depend on the belief that the model
nonetheless provides a useful idealization of the world, and
that minor variations from the model’s assumptions will only
slightly degrade the model’s normative power.70
That may be true of some models, but it is not true of
this one—at least not at the level of generality at which formal
deductions about law operate. Recall that the reason a
situation involves bilateral precaution in the first place is that
the injurer and the victim face different costs in the
precautions they might take.71 (Otherwise, the case could more
easily be treated as one of unilateral precaution, in which a
single party takes all the care needed to reduce the costs of
accidents to an optimal level.) Accordingly, a small change in
the precautions Xavier actually takes can mandate a very large
change in the precautions Yvonne should efficiently take, and
vice-versa.72 As an example, Yvonne’s optimal behavior (from
both her perspective and an overall social one) might look very
different depending on whether Xavier does or doesn’t install
spark arresters on his railroads, even if those spark arresters
are very cheap.

“courts must generally consider the entire tableau of costs and effectiveness of care for
the two parties to determine optimal care for either.” Id. at 188 n.17. One way of
understanding my central argument in the text about the model’s fragility is that this
“entire tableau of costs and effectiveness” need not, in any situation, exhibit any
regularity or predictability. Id. Minor changes to it (based on, for instance, small
changes in what courts expect injurers and victims to do) can radically change courts’
beliefs about which precautions are optimal.
69
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 38, at 343-47 (analyzing, as a variation on the
economic model that came to underlie economists’ modern understanding of tort law,
the effects of informational limitations for injurers and victims).
70
Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 347 (suggesting, with specific
reference to the bilateral-liability-threat model of tort law, that “[i]t is usually best to
build theory from clean results and then handle any messy results as exceptions”).
71
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
72
*
More formally, a small change in x can require a large change in y , and a
*
small change in y can require a large change in x .
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As a result, the central internal problem with the
prevailing formal models of negligence is that they are
untenably fragile: they do not resist minor modification to the
parties’ behavior. To say this differently, the models are
premised on a theoretical perfection, and the slightest variation
from this perfection can make their equilibrium collapse
entirely, rather than degrade gracefully. Instead of providing
an approximation of the real world, they threaten to provide
virtually nothing in the real world.
*
As an example, even if we can narrow x down to a
relatively small range (say, a rough projected expenditure on a
few different kinds of spark arresters), this may not be
*
sufficient to determine what y is. In the general case, we need
*
*
full information about x in order to specify y , and vice-versa.
There is little opportunity to reach a second-best result:
*
admitting that we are not sure of x means we cannot be sure of
*
y , and nothing in the economic model guarantees that this
uncertainty will not spiral out of control, so that we are no
*
longer even roughly sure of x .73 Even a very good prediction
based on aggregate or generally constant behavior is
insufficient to ensure that the model reaches what economists
call a convergent—that is, a stable—result. Slight changes to
one party’s precaution can have unpredictable effects on those
that the other parties should take.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the model cannot
work in any case, no matter how stylized; my criticism is that
the model cannot be applied to the general case and that
therefore, it cannot justify negligence rules as a general matter.
In the general case, even when an injurer can estimate victims’
precaution reasonably well and a victim can represent injurers’
precaution reasonably well, the model cannot tell us what to
do.
Moreover, even if we assume that injurers, victims, and
courts have perfect information about what precautions would
be socially optimal given the expected probability and harm
from accidents, there are additional reasons that the model’s
fragility is triggered as soon as it is applied to any real case.

73

Of course, it is unfair to expect an economic model to provide stronger
conclusions than are justified by the information available to us in the real world. My
objection to the model is not that it cannot yield an optimal result given suboptimal
information. Rather, my argument is that the model cannot work at all in the general
case, in the way it was intended, without perfect information.
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For one thing, even if an individual party is perfectly
rational and has perfect information, he or she must
accommodate the possibility—even in just a probabilistic
sense—that other parties will not behave perfectly rationally or
have perfect information. In other words, even if both parties
turn out to be perfectly rational and fully informed, they would
have to account for the possibility that other people are not.
As an example, consider a simple game in which a group
of people are asked to choose numbers from zero to one
hundred.74 The group’s numbers will be averaged. The winner
of the game is the member of the group who chose a number
closest to half the group’s average. In a game populated only by
fully rational players, the optimal choice would be zero.75 But in
practice, even a fully rational agent would not choose zero,
because he or she would expect error or irrationality in other
people’s choices.76 In other words, it is fully rational to expect
irrationality or lack of information in others, at least
probabilistically.
The problem that this observation poses for the
bilateral-liability-threat model is that it cannot in practice be
*
*
efficient to dictate efficient legal standards, x and y , based on
the presumption that both parties will expect the other to
behave perfectly. Xavier and Yvonne cannot (and should not)
plan their behavior in view of that assumption. But once we
recognize this, the model unravels; again, without shared
*
*
knowledge of the optimal pair of values for x and y , neither
can be set in the general case. We can try to guess what
precautions Xavier will in fact choose, and set the legal
standard for Yvonne accordingly; then, we can try to guess
what Yvonne will in fact choose, based on this standard, and
set the standard for Xavier accordingly. But then this change
in the standard will alter Xavier’s behavior, which in turn will

74

This example, called a “p-beauty contest game,” is drawn from HERVE
MOULIN, GAME THEORY FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1982); see also Avinash Dixit,
Restoring Fun to Game Theory, 36 J. ECON. EDUC. 205 (2005) (discussing this game
from a pedagogical perspective).
75
If all players in the group chose one hundred, the best choice would have
been fifty. Members of the group, knowing this, could all choose fifty. But then, all
players could figure out that fifty would be the average, so they would want to choose
twenty-five, and so on.
76
For experimental results of this game in practice, see Rosemarie Nagel,
Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1313
(1995) (demonstrating that people do not behave as if they assume everyone else were
perfectly rational).
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alter Yvonne’s behavior, and nothing guarantees that an
efficient equilibrium will result in the general case.
There is another, perhaps simpler, way to express this
problem and related ones: we can analyze the situation from
the perspective of the parties, rather than the policymakers
*
*
setting x and y . For example, Cooter is rightly concerned,
throughout much of his analysis of legal rules, with what he
calls the “paradox of compensation”77—the notion that when
efficiency requires “double responsibility at the margin”78 from
multiple parties, there is no single efficient legal rule that
provides the right incentives to everyone. This was, in short,
the problem we saw with rules of strict liability and no liability
earlier: strict liability might give injurers efficient incentives,
but it leaves victims free to take no precautions at all, at least
in theory, because all their harms are compensated by injurers.
Rules providing for no liability do the reverse: they give victims
incentives to take precautions, because they bear the costs of
harm, but injurers are free to do as they please. In defending
the bilateral-liability-threat model of negligence rules,
economists have offered it as a solution to this “paradox” of
compensation.
But the problem is that a mere threat of liability cannot
solve this paradox. Even a fully rational Xavier, or Yvonne, will
know under a negligence regime that there is some chance they
will avoid liability and some chance they will not. For instance,
*
suppose that the legal standard sets x (Xavier’s efficient
precautions) to $80, which might correspond to a requirement
to install spark arresters. The economic model that justifies
negligence rules suggests that Xavier will choose $80 as his
level of precaution because he fears liability if he doesn’t.79 But
this liability is not certain under all negligence rules, even if
perfect enforcement of the law is assumed. For instance, under
a rule of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence
(unlike a rule of pure strict liability), Xavier knows that there
is some chance that Yvonne will not meet her standard of
*
liability (y ). As a result, it may not be efficient for Xavier to
spend $80 on precautions in all cases, even if he is fully

77
78
79

Cooter, supra note 16, at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
See SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 184-85; Cooter, supra note 16, at 9-10.
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rational.80 Instead, he may spend less under some conditions
because he may expect that he will sometimes be able to avoid
liability altogether (because of Yvonne’s own negligence).81 But
*
given this possibility, then—as before—the y that courts have
chosen for Yvonne may not be socially optimal in a second-best
*
sense, which in turns means that the x that courts have chosen
for Xavier may not be optimal in that sense, and so on. The
model threatens to unravel, again, because of the slightest
perturbation.
Moreover, given also the probabilistic nature of the
harms in question—that is, fires in Xavier and Yvonne’s case
are not certain but merely possible—construction of
purportedly optimal standards is made even more difficult. As
Shavell notes, the economic models in question are meant
specifically to address probabilistic harms.82 But this means
*
*
that x and y may change slightly as a result of new
information that comes to light; for instance, if the likelihood of
a train-related fire for the next year is estimated to be 1 in
200,000 on March 22, the likelihood may go down to 1 in
240,000 as the result of greater-than-expected ambient
humidity (which makes fires less likely) in late March. This
kind of minor perturbation in probabilities would not pose a
significant problem for a robust model, but given the kinds of
80

This result is well understood in the economic literature. See, e.g., John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
81
In other words, there is no reason to assume that Xavier will assume that
*
the probability of Yvonne’s compliance with her legal standard (y ) is equal to 1. To
elaborate the discussion in the text, consider that the formal economic model
*
guarantees that Xavier’s total cost when he chooses x < x will be at least as great as
*
his cost when he chooses x • x , because if the total social costs of accidents were lowest
*
*
*
at a point smaller than x (given a constant y ), then x itself ought to be lowered to that
point. But nothing guarantees that Xavier’s expected costs, in view of the probability of
*
*
Yvonne’s compliance with her legal standard y , are not lower when x < x . These
expected costs are essentially a weighted average between x and (x + p(x,y)a) when x <
*
x (weighted by Xavier’s estimated probability of Yvonne’s compliance), and such an
*
average might be smaller than x .
Of course, if both parties assume the other will make calculations of this
kind, the analysis becomes even more complicated. The particular expected results
depend on a variety of case-specific features and cannot be derived in the abstract, and
there is no reason to assume it will result in an efficient equilibrium in the general
case.
This situation shares some features with a continuous iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. For an interesting analysis of that phenomenon from a biological perspective,
see generally Stephen Le & Robert Boyd, Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 245 J. THEORETICAL BIO. 258 (2007).
82
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 177 (“We will assume that accidents and
consequent liability arise probabilistically.”).
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fragility in the model that I have described, it is hard to be
confident that a stable justification for purportedly efficient
*
*
standards (that is, for specific values of x and y ) will exist in
many cases. If nothing else, the economic model’s dependency
on full knowledge of both parties’ efficient precautions makes it
less likely that either side’s efficient precautions can be
specified in any given case.
In short, while some idealizations—including economic
ones—can serve as useful approximations of the world from
which we can later veer, the bilateral-liability-threat model
underlying modern economists’ view of tort law is untenably
fragile if its goal is to justify application of negligence
standards to real cases. An idealization cannot justify specific
policy propositions in law when the slightest change in
information or behavior threatens chaotic results.83 Far from
explaining the central feature of Anglo-American tort law, the
purported economic justification of the negligence standard
provides very little justification for the rule in practice.
3. Alternative Formulations of the Economic Model
My observations and analysis in the prior section
addressed a continuous version of the model—that is, one that
allows precautions to vary to any possible levels, so that a level
of precaution might be set to $74.82, or $100.64, and so on.84 We
might alternatively formulate the bilateral-liability-threat
model as discrete rather than continuous, which is to say that
we might imagine (say) four particular on-or-off precautions
that the parties might take. For instance, in a particular
situation, we might observe that Xavier has a choice of two
spark arresters, one that costs $80 and reduces the likelihood
of fires by fifty percent, and one that costs $240 and reduces
the likelihood of fires by ninety percent. If these are Xavier’s

83

I mean “chaotic” in both a lay sense and a technical sense. For more
information on chaos theory, which characterizes (among other things) the way in
which small changes in the inputs to a system can cause wild swings in its output, see
Robert Bishop, Chaos, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chaos/.
84
Strictly speaking, dollar values are not in practice continuous because they
do not extend beyond two decimal places (to cover cents). But because the value of a
cent is so small, familiar statements of value in dollars and cents are for most practical
purposes better treated as continuous rather than discrete.
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only choices, his precaution is said to be discrete (or
discontinuous) rather than continuous.85
Shavell’s most recent statement of the purported
economic basis of tort law is framed in largely discrete terms.
For instance, though his argument tracks the one I have
already laid out, and though it is formalized in the same way,86
his particular example involves three possible levels of
precaution: “none,” “moderate,” and “high.”87
The reason that the difference between discrete and
continuous models may be important here is that discreteness,
versus continuousness, may save a model from its own
fragility. In other words, if Xavier has only three levels of
precaution available to him, then minor perturbations in
probabilities as he understands them, or in his expectations of
Yvonne’s conduct, are less likely to be significant enough to
cause him to change from an efficient option to a distinct,
inefficient one.
While it is possible that the discreteness of available
precautions will allow an efficient equilibrium to converge in
some cases, there are several reasons that the flaws of the
continuous model may still apply in practice to many cases.
The world ordinarily offers many options, rather than just two
or three. Drivers setting air-conditioning levels in their cars
might have only a few levels to choose from (off, low, high, and
so on), but in choosing the speed of their cars they face
possibilities that are continuous rather than discrete.
Pedestrians have enough options in choosing their speed,
location, and how often they look at traffic for us to imagine,
plausibly, that they face essentially a continuous range of
choices about the amount of precaution they take. Railroaders
usually won’t have only a simple option of spark arresters, but
an array of choices in both the kind of precautions they choose
(spark arresters versus alternative track design versus
alternative track location) and the level of the precautions they
choose (perhaps facing a menu of eighty different spark
arresters they might purchase from a variety of suppliers). The
same is true of many other decisions, like what kind of

85

Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 247 (“Notice that buckling a seat belt
is a discontinuous choice (yes-no). For discontinuous precaution, the relative efficiency
of different rules depends upon particular facts.”).
86
See SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 179.
87
Id.
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seatbelts an automobile manufacturer should install, what sort
of fence to use to surround a swimming pool, and so forth.
In any event, as the legal economists recognize, the
success or failure of the formal economic model at stake here
depends on the adequacy of the continuous model, rather than
a discrete analogue of it, because it is the continuous model
that expresses in a general form the conclusions that result
from formal proof. As Cooter and Ulen write, “In general,
discontinuous variables and cost functions yield messy results
about optima, whereas continuous variables and cost functions
yield clean results. It is usually best to build theory from clean
results and then handle any messy results as exceptions.”88 If
the bilateral-liability-threat model depends on “messy results”
in specific cases, that would, if nothing else, sharply limit its
force as a general explanation of tort law’s negligence standard.
C.

The Limits of Activity Levels

The other pillar of the modern economic analysis of tort
law is the view that residual liability—that is, decisions about
whether the injurer or the victim should bear the costs of
accidents
when
both
have
behaved
innocently
(nonnegligently)—should be determined based on an analysis
of activity levels. Specifically, the leading economists’ argument
is that residual liability should depend either on “[w]hether
injurers’ levels of activity are more important to control than
victims’”89 or on which party’s “activity level most affects
accidents.”90
The problem with this view is that, while an
understanding of activity levels sheds significant insight into
the formal economic analysis of tort law, it ordinarily cannot
serve as a basis for decisions in real cases. There are several
reasons for this; they involve problems related to
administrability and to a limitation in the analysis’s scope that
makes it difficult for present economic models to promote
efficient incentives, even for rational parties.

88
89
90

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1.
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 202.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 349.
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1. Problems of Administrability
At the outset, it is important to consider whether
economists have even attempted to offer a clear operational
role for activity levels in determining tort rules. Consider, for
example, Shavell’s most recent explanation of how activity
levels should matter in tort law:
Whether injurers’ levels of activity are more important to control
than victims’ will depend on the context. As discussed before, when
an activity of injurers (walking dogs of a vicious breed) creates
substantial risks despite their exercise of due care, the activity will
be desirable to control. This point is not fundamentally altered if
account is taken of the activities of victims that expose them to risk.
Especially if the victims’ activities are just the activities of ordinary
life (walking about, going to work), we would not want the activities
constrained in favor of injurers’ more dangerous activities.
Conversely, when an activity of injurers (playing baseball) is not
very dangerous if appropriate care is taken, the importance of
controlling the activity will not be great; instead, we may see some
advantage in reducing certain activities of victims that subject them
to particular risks (such as pushing a baby in a stroller across a
baseball field while a game is in progress).91

Though motivated primarily by efficiency, this formulation
seems essentially noneconomic in nature, as if economic
analysis has led us to a point where other considerations ought
to reign, or where the costs and benefits are too complicated for
present-day economics to study. If this is the case, there is little
more to say except to note my agreement, for my goal here is to
show that formal economics is insufficient on its own to
determine optimal legal rules.
To say this differently, Shavell’s explanation, read
broadly, is a sensitive balancing test—so sensitive that it
appears to allow essentially noneconomic considerations, or at
least considerations very hard to quantify through narrow
economic analysis, to influence tort rules. It is not clear,
ultimately, that Shavell disagrees with me that formal
economic analysis on this point is not especially helpful.
The formulation in Cooter and Ulen’s textbook, though
more specific, appears to be incomplete, at least on a narrow
reading. They describe the role of activity levels as follows:
Usually one party’s activity level affects accidents more than the
other party’s activity level. Efficiency requires choosing a liability

91

SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 202-03.
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rule so that the party whose activity level most affects accidents
bears the residual costs of accidental harm.92

But, of course, looking only at which party’s activity level more
directly causes accidents violates the general economic
observation that the law needs to be sensitive not just to costs
of activities but to their benefits. Extra driving might indeed
affect the level of accidents more than extra pedestrian activity
on sidewalks, but it is at least possible that the benefit drivers
get from extra driving is worth this extra cost. On economic
terms alone, Cooter and Ulen’s conclusion should likely be read
more broadly and interpreted to assign liability in ways that
reduce the total costs of precaution (including limited activity)
plus the total expected costs of accidents. In other words, it is
not the party whose activity most increases the likelihood of
accidents that needs to bear residual liability, but the party
who can restrict activity in ways that reduce social costs
optimally.
Even on this broader reading of Cooter and Ulen’s (and
perhaps Shavell’s) conclusion, however, activity-levels
arguments would face serious problems as soon as courts or
other parties tried to apply them. As I noted when introducing
activity levels,93 there is in principle little difference between
choices about levels of care and choices about levels of activity,
except that courts judge the former but tend not to judge the
latter. But there are several reasons, in fact, that it makes
sense for courts to avoid making judgments related to activity
levels, and these reasons apply regardless of whether it is
courts or other policymakers (or commentators) who set or
defend particular legal rules.
To begin with, as Shavell’s formulation of the role of
activity levels seems to recognize,94 there are many cases in
which more activity does not lead to more accidents, as long as
the activity is conducted safely. Does more walking on the
sidewalk necessarily lead to more accidents between cars and
pedestrians, assuming the pedestrians are all safe? It seems
unlikely: safe pedestrians keep to the sidewalk (and
crosswalks), look for oncoming traffic, and in general don’t get
hit by cars unless those cars veer off the road. Now, it is
92

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 349.
See supra Part II.A.3.
94
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 203 (referring to activity that “is not very
dangerous if appropriate care is taken”).
93
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possible that increased pedestrian activity increases the
likelihood that people will get hit by cars, even if the
pedestrians are careful, because there might be some cases in
which cars veer onto sidewalks but avoid accidents only
because those sidewalks were empty. In other words, there
might be cases in which empty sidewalks result in harmless
veering by cars, whereas full sidewalks result in serious
accidents. But in practice, this situation is vague and unlikely
to matter: there is enough physical space in the world, and on
most sidewalks, that it seems implausible that there is even a
measurable increase in the likelihood of an accident between a
car and a pedestrian just because there are more pedestrians
on the sidewalk.
Many cases are like this on both sides. Despite frequent
assumptions that faultless accidents are commonplace, it is
not, in fact, even clear that many car accidents result from
mere activity, when the activity is safe. Ordinarily in a car
accident there is some culprit, perhaps unidentified, who was
at least careless: machinery fails because of a defect, a driver
was driving unsafely given road conditions, a tire was under- or
over-inflated, or something else was done incorrectly. Perhaps
some car accidents are truly unavoidable even when everyone
involved has behaved reasonably safely, but it is not clear that
there are many such accidents or that the possibility of such
accidents should dictate tort policy.
A separate problem is that the force of activity-levels
arguments depends in part on the proposition that parties
expect to be able to avoid liability when they act safely. But in
many cases, this proposition assumes too much: many people
who engage in potentially dangerous activities do not know
that they are able to maintain a high level of safety, and in fact
many know otherwise. For example, drivers cannot ensure that
they are not going to be careless.95 If nothing else, people’s
general knowledge that they cannot avoid carelessness
mitigates the force of activity-levels arguments.
But perhaps the most significant problem applying
activity levels to real tort cases is that reasoning in view of
activity levels requires classificatory judgments that are nearly
impossible to make in a principled fashion. For one thing, there
95

See Mark Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 887, 900 (1994) (“It is impossible to drive a car for any period of time without
missing a required precaution.”); see also MARC FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW &
ALTERNATIVES 46 (8th ed. 2006) (discussing Grady’s article).
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are many situations in which injurers and victims are similarly
situated, or in fact engaged in the same activity (or an activity
that might as well be the same). For instance, what would an
understanding of activity levels suggest for accidents between
two automobiles? Both drivers chose to drive. What about for
airplane crashes, as between the airline and its passengers?
Both the airline and the airplane passengers chose to take the
particular flight that crashed.96
Even when parties are situated differently in noticeable
ways, there is generally not a principled economic method to
determine whose activity level makes more of a difference
(including both its costs and its benefits) and thus is more
worth regulating. What of accidents between cars and
pedestrians, where both were behaving safely? If such cases
indeed occur frequently enough to worry about, whose activity
makes more of a difference, accounting for both costs and
benefits, and responds better to incentives? On what basis
could a court decide?
Even Shavell’s examples of supposedly clearer cases
raise many of these problems. When considering “walking dogs
of a vicious breed,” for example, it is important to ask whether
this activity really is dangerous “despite [the] exercise of due
care.”97 And, though pushing a baby in a stroller through the
middle of a baseball game is obviously an activity that should
be minimized (and indeed not one that would appear to reflect
the exercise of due care in a way that even triggers activitylevels arguments, because the activity can be judged unsafe on
its own), what should we do about baseball stadiums and the
people who live (or build houses) behind them, such that
baseballs might break their windows? The levels of activity of
both injurers and victims in cases like this appear to be
symmetric, and recognizing activity levels does not break the
symmetry.
Dynamite cases, and other activities where “a
commercial actor has come to the type of location where [some]
sort of dangerous thing is not normally done,”98 reflect perhaps
the strongest case for activity-levels arguments, in view of the
96

See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and
Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art2 (observing the same thing, in a related
context, about doctors and patients).
97
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 203.
98
Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement
(Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 608 (2002).
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administrative problems I have just discussed. In these cases,
there is perhaps a clear social understanding that an accident
can be attributed to the level of one party’s, rather than
another party’s, activities. Still, even these cases involve
something of a noneconomic value judgment. For one thing, in
theory, victims can still choose where to live in a way that
minimizes the costs to them of activities like dynamite
blasting, and the proper comparison of costs and benefits, on
their own, seems hard to derive without empirical data. What
seems to matter in cases of abnormally dangerous activities is
that one party did something unexpected or unusual, changing
a baseline level of activity that was occurring in an area and
thereby violating social expectations.99 But an analysis that
depends on considerations like that is at least somewhat
broader than a formal economic one.
2. Problems of Efficiency: Allocative Versus
Redistributional Negligence
Even if activity levels could serve as a principled and
administrable basis for assigning residual liability, there are
powerful reasons that we probably would not want it to—at
least without a kind of economic analysis that has not yet been
done. This is because the economic study of torts has limited its
focus100 to the optimization of allocative efficiency through
incentives for injurers and victims to take precaution. In doing
so, it has neglected broader effects of tort rules on social costs.
Consider the ordinary case of what I call allocative
negligence—that is, negligence that directly creates an
allocative inefficiency, in terms of the costs of precaution and
the costs of accidents. For example, suppose Xavier has the
opportunity to install $80 spark arresters to prevent $4000
accidents, and he chooses not to do so. If the law supported his
choice, there can be a clear misallocation of resources: spark
arresters ought to be installed, but Xavier has no incentive to
install them.101

99

See id.
E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (1st ed. 1972)
(giving the classic allocative-efficiency argument for negligence rules).
101
Of course, in a world without transaction costs, Xavier and Yvonne might
bargain over the installation of spark arresters. See generally Coase, supra note 15
(demonstrating that with no transaction costs, assignments of rights in nuisance law
do not affect allocative efficiency).
100
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But in casting problems this way, focusing on the
particular relationship between injurers and victims, economic
tort analysts often ignore a potential problem. I call this the
problem of redistributional negligence—that is, distorted
incentives (ultimately allocative in nature) that arise from tort
regimes that give some parties the opportunity to engage in
activity that is largely or even primarily redistributive. Of
course, such opportunities for opportunistic redistribution may
also be unfair, but for the purposes of this Article I need only
criticize them on economic grounds, and on those grounds the
problem is as follows: the opportunity to externalize costs can
lead to incentives to engage in activity that is productive but
also redistributive.
To say this somewhat differently, selfish rational actors
who can choose between a variety of productive activities will
not choose the one that is socially most productive. Instead,
they will choose the one that earns them the most. However,
some activities are more profitable to actors because they
externalize costs onto others, not because they are more
productive overall. With sufficient capacity to redistribute
wealth through externalities, sanctioned by law, activities can
function as capitalistic black holes, drawing in resources and
effort even if they would be more productively applied
elsewhere.
For example, return to the example of Xavier and
Yvonne. It is common to see this kind of two-party example in
economic analyses of tort law. But consider the following
variation of the situation, which both (1) makes particular costs
and benefits clear and (2) looks beyond the two activities in
question (railroading and cornfield growing).
Xavier has recently graduated from business school. He
has little chance to obtain credit, but he has an inheritance
that he can use to invest in the business of his choice. His skills
and experience make two choices salient: he can set up either a
railroad company or a hotel. Both choices would consume his
entire inheritance and require his full-time attention. Given all
the costs and benefits associated with the opportunity to set up
a hotel, Xavier’s calculation of the expected value102 from that
102

Ordinarily, particularly as a business-school graduate, Xavier would
engage in a net-present-value calculation that would consider the lifetime of the
opportunity, the discount rate of income streams over that lifetime, and similar
considerations. I put aside those details to keep the discussion in the text simple; they
have no bearing on questions relevant to my discussion.
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opportunity is $20,000.103 To compute the expected value of the
railroading opportunity, Xavier considers the following
information he has learned: running the railroad would be
worth $40,000 to him, but the expected costs of fires from the
railroad to Yvonne’s adjacent cornfields are $37,000.
Accordingly, the railroading opportunity is worth only $3000 to
Xavier if tort law makes him liable for these fires; if not, the
opportunity is worth $40,000. Thus, given the figures in this
example, the tort regime directly influences Xavier’s decision
between his two business opportunities. Under a strict-liability
regime, Xavier will choose the hotel, because the railroad—
though profitable—has a large part of its value set to pay for
the harms it causes. Under a negligence regime, however,
Xavier can ignore these harms, because his $40,000 value
exceeds the $37,000 cost to the cornfield and is thus deemed
“reasonable.”104 In that case, we expect that he will choose the
railroad over the hotel, even though it is less socially valuable,
because it gives him an opportunity to redistribute more
wealth to himself through the externalities he causes.105
An analysis of activities limited to whether a railroader
or a corn grower’s activity “most affects accidents”106 (or similar
formulations) as between those two parties misses an
important feature of the situation in our example: from the
perspective of allocative efficiency, assuming we have a choice
between railroading and no railroading, we want railroading. It
creates more value than the fires it causes. But we may want
other things more, and if capital and other resources are
limited, we want a tort system that discourages relevant
parties from making decisions based on how much of other
people’s wealth they can redistribute to themselves by
externalizing costs onto others.107
103

We can take this as an opaque figure, although it would be possible to
specify details about the costs and benefits of the hotel opportunity and to assess the
liabilities that Xavier could face as the owner-operator of a hotel. For the purposes of
the example, however, I assume (just for simplicity) that the hotel gives rise to no
significant liability or cost externalization, whereas the railroad does. This assumption
does not change the force of the argument in the text.
104
Assuming, again, that he is strictly rational and selfish, does not fear
negative publicity, and so on.
105
Cooter and Porat call this situation a “liability externality,” and agree
generally that legal rules “should discourage activities with negative liability
externalities.” Cooter & Porat, supra note 96, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
106
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1, at 349.
107
To say this differently, economists who promote negligence rules for
reasons only of narrow microeconomic conceptions of allocative efficiency would subject
tort victims to Nozick’s “utility monsters,” who derive so much value from some
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Of course, if every wealth-producing business
opportunity can be pursued—for instance, if capital markets
are perfectly efficient and other significant transaction costs
are minimal—then we may not care whether Xavier becomes a
hotel operator or a railroad operator. In a world with no
transaction costs and unlimited resources, whichever
opportunity he forgoes (with its attendant wealth-producing
and externalizing effects) will be taken up by someone else
anyway. But as long as resources are not infinite and there are
significant inefficiencies in the ability to nimbly pursue new
business opportunities (because of resource limitations,
borrowing costs, capital-market inefficiencies, and so on), social
efficiency requires such opportunities to be priced as correctly
as possible. To say this differently, it is not enough to say that
we want to limit activities to levels at which they are still
wealth-producing; it may also be vital to overall allocative
efficiency for activities to be appropriately priced.
Note that this recognition, alone, doesn’t solve the
central problem that faces tort law, because it does not specify
precisely what it means for activities to be priced
appropriately. As commentators have long recognized,108 there
is a symmetry between injurers and victims: strict liability for
railroaders, though it prevents railroaders from engaging in
redistributive, cost-externalizing activity, might mean that
corn growers have too much of an incentive to engage in corn
growing, compared to other activities. But for tort law’s
solutions to this problem to be efficient, they cannot
conceptualistically restrict their scope to the costs of accidents
and precautions; they need instead to face all social costs and
benefits squarely.
To summarize, analysis internal to a particular activity,
or to the interaction between one activity and another, may
well be insufficient to decide even the efficiency (much less the
broader social appropriateness) of tort regimes that govern that
activity. It may well be necessary to look at the “entire
tableau”109 (to borrow Shavell’s phrase) of social costs and
activities that others must suffer in order to satisfy their appetites. See ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974). If utility monsters are rewarded,
however, then an allocatively inefficient result more broadly obtains: there is too much
incentive to become like them, and not enough to engage in other activity.
108
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 30, at 138-40 (making the point, among
others, that strict liability gives injurers but not victims efficient incentives to research
new precautions, and vice versa).
109
SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 188 n.17.
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benefits—not just for the individual activities in question but
for those activities as compared with other activities—in order
to decide who should pay for which costs. Each activity, and its
costs and benefits, are only part of a broader economic
landscape.
Of course, Shavell is ultimately right—if we interpret
him broadly enough—that our focus in deciding between strict
liability and negligence depends on which activity is “more
important to control.”110 But there is no reason to suppose that
the question can be decided by the kind of activity-levels
arguments that economists have marshaled so far. Instead,
deciding between strict liability and negligence seems to
demand a significantly broader judgment about which
activities should bear the costs of accidents and which should
not. Abstract and formal methodologies, unsurprisingly, have
little aid to offer those seeking to make that kind of judgment.
In any event, it would be a mistake—even on grounds of
efficiency alone—to focus only on incentives to take precautions
in deciding questions of tort liability, because the prices of
activities can have broader incentive effects in society.
D.

Precautions and Activity Levels

The Hand Formula itself occasionally suffers from
classificatory problems similar to those faced by activity-levels
arguments.111 These are best conceived as problems of timeframing, though I mean something different by this than many
other discussions of time-framing in this context.112
To see these problems, consider again the example of
Xavier and Yvonne, the railroader and the cornfield owner. In
this example, which we borrowed from Cooter, Xavier was said
to have three precautions available to him: installing spark
arresters, running trains more slowly, and running fewer
trains.
Running fewer trains sounds like an activity-levels
concern, in that it would be hard to judge from a single
instance whether Xavier had run inefficiently many trains.

110

Id. at 202.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
112
Cf. Douglas Husak & Brian P. McLaughlin, Time-Frames, Voluntary Acts,
and Strict Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 95, 96 (1993) (discussing “time-framing” problems
raised by Mark Kelman and Larry Alexander that concern how individual acts are to
be judged).
111
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Consider, for instance, an accident that occurs on May 13,
2006, at 12:10 a.m. It makes little sense to ask whether Xavier
was running too many trains at that particular point in time;
the question is not “What should Xavier have done at time T,
the moment the accident occurred?” because the decision to run
more or fewer trains goes beyond that particular time. More
precisely, there are multiple time intervals that include time T,
and there is no clear way to choose among them. What does it
mean to say that Xavier should have run fewer trains? Fewer
trains on May 13, 2006? In May 2006? In all of 2006 up to that
point? Or over a broader period? What if Xavier had planned to
run fewer trains later in the year, after the fateful accident
happened (unfortunately) to arise? Could he convince a court
that this plan was genuine, or would he have an inefficient
incentive under an economically informed negligence rule to
reschedule his trains evenly throughout the year (even if this
weren’t otherwise optimal) in order to be confident that he
could demonstrate that he ran fewer trains? Because courts
cannot easily answer these questions, running trains is
classified as an activity-levels problem, not as one about which
courts can judge care or precaution directly.113
Unfortunately for tests like the Hand Formula,
however, the same kind of reasoning applies to questions that
are not so readily seen as activity-levels problems. For
instance, what does it mean that on May 13, 2006, Xavier
didn’t use spark arresters on his trains? Perhaps he had
decided that, given the expected wear on spark arresters and
the expected cost of fires, it was optimal to use them some but
not all of the time.114 Over what period are we to evaluate that
question? In some sense, every question about precaution
under the Hand Formula can be reframed as a potentially
intractable activity-levels problem.115

113

Cf. supra Part II.A.3. Note that decisions about activity levels suffer from a
similar problem: in addressing which party’s activity more directly affected accidents,
or whatever else, questions of time framing may be decisive.
114
Cf. Grady, supra note 95 (distinguishing the adoption of standards of
precaution with compliance to those standards, and observing that “[i]n most activities,
courts require perfect compliance; in others they do not”).
115
Shavell admits that there are other, somewhat similar concerns about the
Hand Formula. For instance, “there may be dimensions of injurers’ care (such as the
frequency with which drivers look in their rearview mirrors) that courts would not take
into account in the determination of negligence because of difficulties in assessing
them.” SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 189.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps surprisingly, then, we reach the conclusion that
the prominent economic models still struggle fundamentally
with the most basic question in tort law: when should there be
liability? Far from having easily succumbed to formal economic
analysis, tort law has firmly resisted simple or reductive
explanations.
That said, my goal here has not been to minimize the
insights of economists or to suggest that they be ignored.
Indeed, law-and-economics scholars have successfully
explained why the negligence standard is a minimal standard
of liability. That is, liability must ordinarily be awarded at
least in those cases where it would be inefficient, from the
perspective of allocative efficiency, not to do so. I have called
these cases of negligence, where precautions are clearly
cheaper than the expected costs of the accidents they are
designed to prevent, cases of allocative negligence, and
economic analysis has indeed helped illuminate questions
related to these cases.
Of course, such cases have not been especially
controversial.
The
fundamental
questions
concerning
negligence rules in tort law are whether they are better or
worse than greater standards, not lesser ones. Perhaps the
most basic question in tort law is whether behavior ought to be
governed by rules of negligence, rules of strict liability, or
perhaps something roughly in between. Economic analysis has
helped characterize this question, but on its own, it does not
provide an answer.
There are several reasons formal economic analysis of
negligence rules is insufficient, even for commentators who
believe that concerns about efficiency are paramount. For one
thing, the prevailing formal defense of the efficiency of
negligence standards—what I have called the bilateralliability-threat argument—rests on a fragile economic model
that breaks down rapidly, rather than degrading gracefully, as
soon as assumptions are recognized to be slightly imperfect. It
is one thing for a model to approximate the real world rather
than purport to describe it perfectly. But the bilateral-liabilitythreat model threatens to unravel, in the general case, upon
slight modifications to its assumptions.
The other pillar of the modern economic analysis of tort
law is an understanding of activity levels, but arguments based
on this understanding have limited force for courts and other
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policymakers. The chief reason is that rules based on activity
levels ordinarily cannot be applied to real cases; there are
problems of framing, classification, information, and relevance
that undermine attempts to put the theoretical understanding
into practice, even if actors were rational and selfish and other
classic assumptions of law-and-economics commentators were
true. Moreover, the scope of activity-levels arguments, and
perhaps of much economic analysis of tort law generally, has
been too narrow. It has limited itself to only a few kinds of
costs and benefits. As a result, the analysis is in danger of
ignoring the problem that I have called redistributional
negligence, where activity, although allocatively desirable, is
priced incorrectly because of socially inefficient tort rules that
nonetheless comport with leading economic models.116

116

This incorrect pricing helps explain, at least broadly, several other kinds of
efficiency-related problems that others have observed. See, e.g., David Gilo & Ehud
Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 277 (2009) (arguing that negligence standards might not lead only to too much
safe activity, as traditional activity-levels analysis suggests, but also to too little safe
activity). It should not be surprising that such problems exist under the prevailing
economic models.

